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1. Introduction
Due to demographic aging of the population – a process that has been progressing 
in nearly all economically developed countries (for example the EU or OECD 
Member States) – public pension systems are not able to maintain the standard of 
living after retirement, to provide adequate old-age income. Additional pension 
systems – individual or occupational pension schemes – should fill this financial 
gap. There are, however, serious concerns about individuals under saving for 
retirement, in spite of economic incentives offered by state institutions and 
regulations (most popular – tax incentives). Policymakers in many countries take 
actions to stimulate the development of additional voluntary forms of retirement 
savings (Rutecka 2014; Jedynak 2016; Marcinkiewicz 2018). Traditional 
incentives – such as tax incentives, matching contributions or institutional 
regulations supporting retirement savings are not always efficient. For example, 
tax benefits for participants of supplementary pension systems are most often used 
by wealthy people. They have some positive impact on retirement savings but 
generally it is limited in generating new savings1.  
The achievements of behavioral economics are used to stimulate additional 
retirement savings generally and in the following three ways, impact  the decision-
making process: 1) changing the choice architecture, 2) changing the reference 
system (framing) and 3) offering appropriate behavioral incentives (nudges).  
Nudges can be defined as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 6). Nudges 
have been implemented in a variety of contexts (pension systems, health systems, 
other areas of public policy) to alter people’s behavior.  
1 This assessment of the limited effectiveness of traditional incentives to participate in 
additional pension schemes applied to pension schemes of voluntary nature. Mandatory 
or quasi-mandatory additional or supplementary pension schemes (in such countries as the 
Netherlands, Sweden or Switzerland) usually play an effective role in stimulating 
additional pension savings. 
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Relatively new instrument to increase savings for retirement – using choice 
architecture and nudges in a form of a default option – is “automatic enrollment”, 
where employers enroll employees automatically into an occupational pension 
scheme. Nudges are specifically designed to preserve agency and control the 
subject making pension decisions. There is always an “opt-out” option (possibility 
to not make use of the nudges). This solution is based on findings of behavioral 
economics (Thaler and Benartzi 2004; Benartzi and Thaler 2013; Madrian 2014; 
Thaler 2016).  
Automatic enrollment as a default option reduces complexity of the decision  
to save in an occupational pension scheme and which financial instruments  
to choose. Default contribution rates paid by employers and employees and 
default allocation make decisions regarding pensions much easier. It also helps  
to avoid another serious problem of retirement savings and financial planning for 
retirement – the lack of self-control and procrastination (understood as “voluntary 
delay of an intended course of action despite expecting potential negative 
consequences for the delay” (Steel 2007).  
Automatic enrollment (or auto-enrollment) has been implemented in various 
countries (USA, New Zealand, UK, Italy, Turkey and since 2019 also in Poland). 
It is gaining popularity as a means to increase the rate of participation in additional 
pension schemes and retirement savings. It is a kind of compromise between 
obligatory and voluntary participation in additional pension schemes.   
 This paper studies the effect of introducing automatic enrollment into workplace 
pensions in the following chosen countries: New Zealand, Great Britain, Turkey). 
The main aim of the research, preliminary results of which have been presented 
in this paper, was to seek an answer to a fundamental question: whether behavioral 
stimuli (nudges) proved to be effective in different countries and in different 
pension schemes, or whether there were significant differences in the strength 
of their impact. And if such differences were identified – what factors would 
influence the effectiveness of nudges in pension systems of different countries.  
2. Behavioral economics literature on retirement savings
and investment choice
Behavioral economics – a relatively new branch of social sciences, developed over 
last 30 years – has considerable real-world applications (Corr and Plagnol  2019).  
It has appeared in response to unrealistic assumptions and a specific anti-
psychology of the so-called mainstream economics. Behavioral economics 
criticizes the assumption about the rationality of decision-makers (based on the 
homo economicus model) and takes a more realistic view of human behavior 
based on evidence that human beings are fallible, easily confused in complex 
scenarios, unable to calculate risk accurately and more irrational than the 
neoclassical theory would suggest. Behavioral economics literature shows that 
there are many deviations from the neoclassical decision-making model, for 
example: intuitive thinking, motivated reasoning and prospect theory (OECD 
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2016, p. 2). The testing of people’s decisions has led to formulation of concepts 
of bounded rationality and bounded self-interest.  
Behavioral economics has been used to explain the phenomena occurring on the 
financial market, and especially regarding the behavior of investors. From the 
point of view of pension economics, it is important that the retirement savings 
behavioral theory has also been established along the retirement behavioral 
theory. Traditional neoclassical economic theory (especially the theory of utility 
maximization) assumes that people in their retirement decisions act in a rational 
and consistent manner. In standard economic models (for example in the Life 
Cycle Hypothesis, Ando and Modigliani 1963) individuals rationally plan their-
long term consumption and savings needs: a part of their earnings in working 
years is saved for the post-working period. Empirical research and comparative 
studies show that most of people do not achieve their long term saving goals, 
especially such as appropriate retirement savings (Lusardi 1999, quoted after: 
Peksevim and Akgiray 2019).   
This article will not present an overview of possible applications of behavioral 
economics in pension economy and public policy as this topic has been 
comprehensively discussed and presented in both foreign and domestic literature 
(Camerer et al. 2004; Cartwright 2018; Corr and Plangnol 2019; Pieńkowska-
Kamieniecka 2017; Szczepański 2017; Jedynak 2019). However, it seems 
necessary to indicate selected results of research on behavioral economics,  
in particular regarding decision-making processes that have been used both 
in pension economics and in the construction of additional pension systems. 
In funded pension systems with individual accounts their participants bear 
investment risk during the accumulation phase. This risk applies to both public 
pension systems with a capital pillar, as well as to additional pension systems 
(individual and company pension systems). The basic policy question in these 
systems is “how much choice workers should have over key decisions, such as the 
choice of provider, the choice of investment portfolio, and the choice of income 
stream at retirement” (Tapia and Yermo 2007, p. 4). There is a number  
of behavioral biases – referring to  systemic patterns of deviation for rational 
human behavior – identified in behavioral economics (see Table 1): 
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Table 1. Chosen behavioral biases which have impact on retirement savings 
Biases Description 
Choice and information 
overload 
The impact of the number of investment choices upon 
investor behavior. 
More choice is not always better. Information overload and 
too many choices. Too many options and information 
overload can lead decision-makers to refrain from acting or 
make wrong decisions. 
Unstable and undefined 
preferences 
The problem of incoherent preferences for making 




Heuristics are mental shortcuts, based on intuitive thinking, 
so called “rules of thumb”, which reduce the complexity of 
assessing probabilities. Many heuristics, which are useful 
in everyday situations, lead to false decisions when 
problems are more complicated and require analytical 
thinking 
Inertia/procrastination: Inertia and procrastination have significant impact on 
decisions about starting retirement savings, amount of 
savings, investment strategy etc. Many decision makers 
(investors) postpone their decisions. This problem is 
connected with “bounded self control” – the problem 
identified by Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) in retirement 
saving decisions. 
Passive decision making Individuals take pass or option of least resistance in 
retirement savings decisions and plans. 
Loss aversion People dislike potential losses more than potential gains 
Framing effect Individuals make or accept certain savings decisions 
because of how the selection or choice is framed  
Present bias Individuals struggle to save more or spend time 
considering savings decisions because they manifest 
limited self-control and willpower and prefer immediate 
gratification over future gains 
Status quo bias and 
anchoring/pure 
endowment effect 
Individuals become anchored to default funds and 
contribution rates as the status quo and treat them as a 
superlative endowment  
Source: own elaboration based on Tapia and Yermo 2007, pp. 6-9 and Townsend 2018, p. 86. 
Key conclusions from the study (Tapia and Yermo 2007) are that a wider array  
of choices, too many investment options can cause information overload and 
confusion. This conclusion was formulated on the basis of comparative analysis 
of 10 countries where participants of pension systems (public pension systems 
with a funded pillar) had to make investment choices. Tapia and Yermo 
recommend introduction of default options and reduction of investment choices 
in public pension schemes with individual accounts and the funded pillar. Similar 
recommendations – also with regard to additional pension schemes – were made 
by many other authors (Thaler 2004; Rutecka 2016).       
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However, it turns out that the use of nudges does not always carry the expected 
results. A comprehensive literature review on the strength of impacts and 
restrictions on the effectiveness of nudges, prepared by Hummel and Maedche 
(2019, p. 1), indicates that “the effect of its influences vary considerably across 
studies (…)”. 
3. The effects of using nudges in the chosen countries – comparative
study
3.1. Automatic enrolment in the U.K. 
An example of the use of defaults to restrict procrastination, delaying decisions to 
start saving was an automatic enrolment of workers to the UK's occupational 
pension schemes with an option to opt out. Between October 2012 and February 
2018, the government rolled out automatic enrolment into workplace pension 
schemes. All employers now have a legal duty to enrol all qualifying workers aged 
between 22 and State Pension age who were earning over GBP 10 000 in 2018/19 
into a qualifying workplace scheme. To support automatic enrolment, the 
government established the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST), a trust-
based occupational defined contribution scheme, to ensure that all employers are 
able to access a good quality, low cost pension scheme. NEST carries a public 
service obligation to accept all employers that wish to set up a pension scheme 
with them regardless of their income (OECD 2019). 
This solution was being successively implemented since 2012 (until 2018)  
in order to increase the level of participation in occupational pension schemes, 
increase the rate of replacement of retirement income relative to the period  
of professional activity and ultimately reduce dependence on the public pension 
scheme, which provides only basic financial security for old age (basic security 
against poverty – see Table 2).  
Table 2. Main features of the pension system in the UK 
Three pillars 
Pillar I The public pension scheme, comprising of the following two 
components: the basic pension and the additional pension. 
Pillar 2 Gathering the occupational pension plans, sub-divided into 
the following two categories: the defined-benefit plans 
(salary-related) and the defined-contribution plans (money 
purchase arrangements); 
Pillar 3 Individual (voluntary and supplementary) pension savings 
products 
Source: Pension Savings: The Real Return 2019, p. 501. 
The public pension system in the U.K. provides only a modest part of retirement 
savings. Privately managed, funded  pension products play a very important role 




Table 3. UK Pension system overview 
Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 
Public pension scheme Occupational pension 
schemes 
Personal pensions:  
Group Personal Pension  
or Individual contracts 
(Stakeholder and Self 
Invested Personal Pensions) 
For men born before 1951 
and women born before 
1953: Basic, Additional 
State pensions Since April 
2016, for men born after 
1951 and women born after 
1953: new State pension 





Mandatory Since 2012, auto-enrolment or 
explicit opt-out. Since 2019, 
compulsory contribution equal 
to 8% of earnings 
Voluntary 
Quick facts 
Source: own elaboration based on Pension Savings: The Real Return 2019, p. 502. 
 
Automatic-enrolment obliges employers to include in the qualifying occupational 
pension scheme all employees who meet certain criteria of age (at least 22 years old), 
income (at least £10,000 per year), and who work exclusively or primarily in the UK 
and pay at least the minimum contribution (Department for Work 2016, p. 1). 
Employees with lower incomes are also entitled to join occupational pension schemes 
but on a voluntary basis. Enrolled employees hold the right of opting out. After three 
years, employers are obliged to enroll them once again unless they resign voluntarily. 
Initially, auto-enrollment covered only large employers, then medium ones, and by 
2018 all employers (large, medium and small enterprises and other workplaces) are 
required to include their employees in an occupational pension scheme and pay the 
required contribution themselves and for their employees.  
Data on automatically enrolled employees who opted out of the program during the 
first month and withdrew their contributions comes from a quantitative survey 
conducted in 2013 on a representative sample of 3000 employers, and a qualitative 
survey involving enterprises included in the quasi-compulsory occupational pension 
scheme in 2014 (Automatic Enrollment 2014). Both of these studies show that the 
percentage of workers who opted out of the occupational pension scheme in which 
they had been enrolled automatically was relatively small – between 9% and 10% in 
2012-2014. This is much less than originally accepted during the program's start-up 
phase in 2012 when it was assumed that up to 30% of employees had opted out. 
People with the lowest income predominated in the first month after enrollment 
among those who opted out.  
There is no doubt that the introduction of automatic enrollment has substantially 
increased participation in the occupational pension scheme (about 60% in 2018) and 
led to an increase in savings regarding a workplace pension (Cribb and Emmerson 
2016, Pensions Regulator 2018). 
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3.2. Automatic enrollment in New Zealand – the KiwiSaver system 
The case of New Zealand can be also regarded as a success story of automatic 
enrollment. New Zealand’s pension system is based on a tax and transfer ‘pay-as-you-
go’ (PAYG) system, including a unique near-universal flat rate one-pillar pension. 
Since 2007, NZS has been complemented by KiwiSaver—a hybrid, Pillar 2/3 scheme 
(a combination of an occupational and an individual pension scheme). “KiwiSaver is 
funded by a mix of individual and employer contributions plus a government 
subsidy known as member tax credit” (MacDonald, Gues 2019). 
KiwiSaver’s statutory purpose under the KiwiSaver Act 2006 was  to encourage long-
term savings and asset accumulation by those who would be unable to maintain their 
pre-retirement standard of living with solely New Zealand public pension scheme and 
voluntary individual pension scheme, so called private superaanuation  (the first pillar 
of the New Zealand’s pension system – see Table 4). 
Table 4. Main design features of the New Zealand pension system 
Three pillars 
Pillar 1 NZS, a universal pension, funded from PAYG. The New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund was established in 2001 to commence partial 
funding of NZS from 2020. 
Pillar 2 KiwiSaver is a hybrid of 2nd Pillar and 3rd Pillar schemes. Minimum 
employer contributions is a 2nd Pillar feature, and the employee opt-out, 
along with optional higher contribution rates, is a 3rd Pillar feature. 
Pillar 3 Voluntary private superannuation separate from KiwiSaver. Taxation is 
the same as for KiwiSaver. No private saving tax incentives. 
Public pension
Eligibility Age 65, subject to residence test*
Amount** Singles 42% of 2016 median weekly wage/salary. Approximately 
40% of average national income (male and female) per beneficiary. 
Couples 32% each of 2016 median weekly wage/salary 
Means testing None
Taxation Taxable at marginal rate 




Employer contribution  
Minimum 3% of gross earnings. Employee contribution Minimum and  
a default rate of 3% (optional rates 4% or 8%) of gross earnings. Applies 
to employees aged 18-65 but employers may choose to continue to 
contribute for employees aged 65+. A contribution holiday cannot be 
taken in the first year of membership without evidence of financial 
hardship. Beyond the first year, it can apply for between three months 
and five years without providing a reason, renewing the holiday at any 
time or taking an unlimited number of future contribution holidays. 
Employer contributions also cease during this period*** 
*For New Zealand residence requirements, see Ministry of Social Development (n.d.). **These figures 
are calculated from the 2016 median New Zealand weekly earnings of NZ$924 (A$883) and maximum 
after-tax weekly 2016 pension payments of NZ$384.76 (A$367.66) (Statistics NZ 2018).  
***As of June 2017, approximately 5 per cent of the membership base is on contribution holidays, 
the majority of which are over 60 months in length (IRD 2017). 




Individuals are auto-enrolled when starting work for the first time or when changing 
jobs. The auto-enrolled individuals can only opt-out within 8 weeks of being 
automatically enrolled. After this period, they can apply for an unlimited number of 
contribution holidays of up to five years. In NZ, members have a unique KiwiSaver 
account throughout their working life. After 13 years, KiwiSaver has over 2.8 million 
members and has become a permanent feature of New Zealand’s pension system and 
savings sector. “The individual is being automatically enrolled (as there is only one 
default fund type) and only requires a contribution rate selection. This means that even 
those automatically enrolled members who wish to select their preferred fund are 
unable to do so. Default members are automatically and randomly allocated into one 
of the nine government appointed default provider funds, with a default contribution 
rate of 3% unless a different rate is consciously selected” (Townstead 2018).  
The number of KiwiSaver members is systematically increasing (see Figure 1). 
Participation rate in KiwiSaver  2018 amounted to about 75%. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Number of active KiwiSaver members by enrollment method 
Source: https://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz/statistics/annual/joining (access: 10.02.2020). 
 
It is worth mentioning that both in New Zealand as well as in the U.K. auto-enrollment 
into pension scheme (nudge, behavioral incentive) is combined with traditional 
financial incentives (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Behavioral and traditional financial incentives in pension systems of New 
Zealand and the U.K.     
Country Minimum contribution rate Financial incentives 
United Kingdom  
 
Employee: 3% but will increase  
to 5% in 2019  
Employer: 2% but will increase  
to 3% in 2019  
Tax Incentives  
 
New Zealand  
 
Employee: 3%  
Employer: 3%  
Government match up  
to NZD 10/week  
Source: own elaboration based on OECD (2019) Pensions at a Glance and G20 Indicators. 
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However, there are significant differences between these two countries as far 
as default fund structure (investment strategy of default funds) is concerned  
(see Table 6). 
Table 6. Behavioral and traditional financial incentives in pension systems of 
New Zealand and the U.K.     
Country % Members in  
the Default Fund  
Type of  
Default Fund 





NEST Funds- Pre-retirement 
Fund, Higher Risk Fund, Lower 
Growth Fund, Ethical Fund, Sharia 
Fund, and Climate Fund  
New 
Zealand  





KiwiSaver Funds- Low risk (100% 
bonds), Defensive (< 20% invested 
in growth assets), Conservative 
(30% shares and property), 
Balanced (50-50% high risk and 
low risk investments), Growth (70-
85% shares and property), and 
Aggressive (90% or more shares)  
Source: own elaboration based on Poksevim and Akagiray 2019, p. 19. 
Automatic allocation system in New Zealand into default fund and contribution rate 
is based on an assumption that most pension scheme participants have not got enough 
financial literacy and limited knowledge about financial markets and investment 
strategy. This assumptions seem to be quite realistic. But there are also negative 
consequences of using nudges (or “soft compulsion”), such as auto-enrollment into 
default low risk fund. Most of automatically enrolled workers stay in conservative 
KiwiSaver default fund. Some authors (Townstead 2018)  propose to change default 
option from conservative fund to a target date fund (life cycle fund)2.   
KiwiSaver has been evaluated as a success of public policy to increase participation 
in additional pension schemes with the use of behavioral incentives (nudges), 
“rational behavior for the government, but not necessarily the best interests  
of KiwiSaver members” (limited effect on the accumulation of net wealth, potentially 
negative impact due to, already mentioned, conservative nature of default schemes – 
see IRD 2015).   
3.3. Automatic enrolment in Turkey – still an initial stage  
Quite a different situation has been observed in Turkey so far, where auto-
enrollment legislation was introduced in 2017. It is important to indicate that – in 
spite of the U.K.’s pension system, with very long tradition of private pension 
2 Such a solution has been introduced in Employee Capital Plans (PPKs) in Poland – new 
occupational pension schemes which will gradually be implemented from 2019 till 2021. 
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funds and huge capital market – the Turkish private pension system is relatively 
new, with short history of 15 years (see Table 7).   
Table 7. Main features of the Turkish pension system 
Pillar 1 State (public) pension scheme 
The PAYG social security programme, 
which covers employees’ old-age pension 
benefits and other social protection needs 
such as health care, survivorship, disability, 
work-related accident and occupational 
diseases, unemployment, and life insurance. 





net and flat rate
supplementary pension.
Pillar 2 Occupational pensions 
The second pillar of the Turkish pension 
system mainly consists of two mandatory 
occupational pension schemes: OYAK and 
TTK plans. OYAK has been established to 
provide pension and other social benefits 
for military personnel, and TTK pension 
plan covers employees of the state-owned 




 OYAK: Armed forces
pension plan.
 TKK: Employees of the
enterprise fund
 250 small occupational
pension plans
Pillar 3 Private Pensions 
A voluntary private pension system (BES) 
was first introduced in Turkey in 2003. The 
main purposes of introducing the third 
pillar pension were to increase domestic 
savings rates and develop domestic capital 
market. 
Voluntary fully-funded DC 
pension systems 
 18 licensed pension
companies and 408
mutual investment funds
 Introduction of auto-
enrolment in 2017
Source: own elaboration based on Poksevim and Akagiray 2019, p. 19. 
Automatic enrollment has been put into effect by Turkish government together 
with a traditional incentive (government contributes up to 25% of the amount paid 
by the employee). First results (data from 2017-2019) show that auto-enrollment 
is expected to boost participation among first-time savers in Turkey (like in New 
Zealand and in the U.K.), but the opt-out rate from the system is relatively high: 
54% in 2018 (Peksevim and Akgiray 2019).  
5. Conclusions and recommendations
A full assessment of the effects of the introduction of a pension scheme with auto-
enrollment in Turkey will be possible over a longer time horizon. However, there are 
significant differences in the first period of implementation of this program compared 
to United Kingdom and New Zealand where a much higher opting-out rate has been 
observed in Turkey. This may be due to the long tradition of additional private savings 
and the maturity of financial market in the UK and short tradition and smaller 
development of the financial market in Turkey. In New Zealand the time to opt out 
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is relatively short and limited after automatic enrollment. It has impact on the 
smaller number of withdrawals in the first years of the system’s operation. 
Also cultural factors should not be underestimated – a different institutional 
tradition and diversity of pension awareness (however, this is a subject to be 
investigated further). 
Undoubtedly the level of generosity of the public pension system affects the 
willingness to participate in additional pension systems. Public pension systems 
in the UK and in New Zealand offer only basic security against poverty and flat 
rate pension benefits. Turkey’s public pension system belongs to the most 
generous in the world, with replacement rate at 102.1% (OECD 2017, p. 107), the 
highest in OECD countries (!). Turkish society is still relatively young but the 
process of demographic aging has already begun there as well. Public PAYG 
pension system will not be able to maintain such high replacement rate in the 
future and additional retirement savings are needed to fill in this gap. 
The general conclusion that can be formulated on the basis of the comparison 
of pension programs with automatic enrollment in these three countries can  
be formulated as follows: Nudges are not a universal panacea for the problem 
of insufficient retirement savings. But they can provide a valuable addition to 
traditional (economic and institutional) incentives.  
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